How to Build a Minimal SBOM Pipeline for Desktop AI Tools

Hook: Desktop AI agents increase risk — SBOMs are no longer optional

Desktop AI tools that act autonomously (file access, local code execution, plugin ecosystems) change the threat model for organizations and individual users. Slow downloads, opaque binaries, and unsigned releases create real risk when an agent can modify or generate outputs on a user machine. If you distribute or rely on desktop AI software in 2026, you need a minimal, repeatable pipeline that produces SBOMs, checksums, and signatures locally, integrates with CI, and binds provenance to every released artifact and autonomous output.

What you'll learn (TL;DR)

• How to generate an SBOM from a local desktop AI build using open-source tools.
• How to compute checksums and sign both artifacts and SBOMs (GPG and Sigstore/cosign).
• How to attach SBOMs to artifacts (filesystem bundle, OCI registry, or release) and verify provenance.
• How to integrate the whole flow into CI (GitHub Actions example) for automated releases and cost-aware runs.

Why this matters in 2026

Two recent trends make SBOM-first pipelines urgent in 2026: first, widespread desktop AI agents that have file-system access and autonomous capabilities (notably seen in late 2025 releases and previews). Second, supply-chain-focused regulation and corporate security programs now expect verifiable provenance for distributed binaries. As one security observer noted in early 2026, when AIs run on desktops they expand the attack surface — and you need machine-readable provenance tied directly to each binary and its outputs.

"Desktop AIs with local file access shift trust from cloud gates to each device's binaries and dependencies — making SBOMs essential for audit and containment."

Design summary: minimal pipeline architecture

  +----------------+     +------------+     +---------------+     +---------------+
  | Developer Box  | --> | Local Build| --> | SBOM + Sign   | --> | Artifact Repo |
  | (desktop AI)   |     | (packaging)|     | (checksum)    |     | (OCI/Release) |
  +----------------+     +------------+     +---------------+     +---------------+
           |                                                            ^
           |                                                            |
           +------------------------------------------------------------+
                             CI (GitHub Actions/GitLab CI)
  

The minimal approach keeps the pipeline deterministic and auditable: generate the artifact, produce an SBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX), compute checksums, sign both artifact and SBOM, and push them together to a repository or release. Optionally, publish provenance attestations to a transparency log (Sigstore / Rekor). Be mindful of CI/per-run costs when enabling extra signing or attestation steps in hosted runners.

Tools you'll use (practical choices in 2026)

• Syft (Anchore) - fast SBOM generation (supports CycloneDX & SPDX).
• CycloneDX / SPDX - interoperable SBOM formats; prefer CycloneDX for CI-attached metadata.
• sha256sum / shasum - deterministic checksums.
• GPG - classic signing for files/releases.
• cosign (Sigstore) - keyless or key-based signatures and transparency log integration.
• oras - push SBOMs and artifacts to OCI registries if you want registry-based binding.
• in-toto / SLSA provenance - optional step for detailed supply chain attestations.

Example project

We'll use a minimal Electron-style desktop AI package (dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz) to illustrate the flow. The same steps apply to native Rust/Go binaries or Python wheels—substitute packaging commands accordingly.

Prerequisites

• Linux/Mac dev box or CI runner
• syft installed: brew install syft OR

  curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin

• cosign installed: follow Sigstore docs or

  brew install cosign

• gpg (for detached signatures)
• oras (optional) for pushing to OCI registries

Step 1 — Build locally and normalize for reproducibility

Reproducible builds are easier to verify. Use environment normalization techniques in your build step:

• Set SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH to a fixed timestamp used for deterministic metadata.
• Strip or normalize timestamps inside archives: tar --mtime=@$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH --sort=name -cf.
• Pin deterministic dependency versions in lockfiles.

# example: normalize and pack
export SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$(date +%s)
mkdir -p dist && tar --mtime=\@$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH --sort=name -cf dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz -C build .

If you need deeper guarantees about binary determinism or software verification, adopt deterministic build flags and check reproducibility across multiple runners.

Step 2 — Generate an SBOM locally

Generate a CycloneDX SBOM for the tarball and for runtime dependencies. Syft inspects layered packages, language manifests, and system packages.

# Generate CycloneDX JSON SBOM for your artifact
syft packages dir:dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz -o cyclonedx-json > dist/sbom.cdx.json

# Or SPXDF JSON
syft packages dir:dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz -o spdx-json > dist/sbom.spdx.json

Tip: also produce a runtime SBOM on the CI runner that mirrors the production environment (same OS, same packaging) to avoid drift between developer boxes and build runners. If your product produces outputs at runtime, tie that runtime SBOM back to your build SBOM (see desktop LLM agent guidance on runtime capture).

Step 3 — Compute checksums

# Compute sha256 for artifact and SBOM
sha256sum dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz | awk '{print $1}' > dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.sha256
sha256sum dist/sbom.cdx.json | awk '{print $1}' > dist/sbom.cdx.json.sha256

Step 4 — Sign artifact & SBOM (GPG and cosign patterns)

You can use traditional GPG detached signatures for releases and also a Sigstore/cosign signature for transparency log entries and keyless CI signing.

GPG detached signature

# create detached ASCII signature
gpg --armor --detach-sign -o dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.asc dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz

# sign SBOM too
gpg --armor --detach-sign -o dist/sbom.cdx.json.asc dist/sbom.cdx.json

Cosign (keyless or key) signing

Cosign supports signing arbitrary blobs and pushing an attestation to the transparency log. In 2026, keyless workflows with OIDC are widely supported in CI — preferred for ephemeral signing without storing long-lived keys on runners.

# keyless sign an artifact (in CI with OIDC configured)
cosign sign-blob --payload dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.sig

# verify
cosign verify-blob --signature dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.sig --payload dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz

If you use a key pair, keep the private key in a secure KMS or use cosign's key management integrations. For device-scoped or user-scoped signing of runtime outputs, prefer privacy-first key handling strategies to avoid leaking long-lived secrets.

Step 5 — Bind SBOM to the artifact (bundle or registry)

The simplest binding is a release bundle: publish artifact + checksum + signatures + SBOM + SBOM signature together. This is human- and machine-friendly. For registry-backed distribution (recommended for scale), push both the artifact and SBOM as OCI artifacts and attach metadata.

Filesystem bundle (fast, universal)

mkdir -p release/myapp-v1.2.0
cp dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz release/myapp-v1.2.0/
cp dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.sha256 release/myapp-v1.2.0/
cp dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz.sig release/myapp-v1.2.0/
cp dist/sbom.cdx.json release/myapp-v1.2.0/
cp dist/sbom.cdx.json.asc release/myapp-v1.2.0/
# create zip for distribution
cd release && tar -czf myapp-v1.2.0-bundle.tar.gz myapp-v1.2.0

OCI registry binding with ORAS (recommended for automation)

# push artifact and SBOM as separate OCI manifest entries
oras push myregistry.example.com/myapp:1.2.0 \
  dist/myapp-v1.2.0.tar.gz:application/gzip \
  --artifact-type application/vnd.myapp.binary

# push SBOM with media type CycloneDX
oras push myregistry.example.com/myapp-sbom:1.2.0 dist/sbom.cdx.json:application/vnd.cyclonedx+json

# optionally attach SBOM as an artifact signed with cosign/attestation
cosign attach --artifact-type cyclonedx --signature dist/sbom.cdx.json.sig myregistry.example.com/myapp:1.2.0

The benefit: registry-level consumers can fetch both the binary and the SBOM, and signatures/attestations are versioned alongside the artifact. For teams implementing registry workflows, check patterns from registry-backed content pipelines and automate retrieval in downstream systems.

Step 6 — CI integration example (GitHub Actions)

A concise GitHub Actions workflow automates the local steps above. Use OIDC for cosign keyless signing to avoid storing private keys in secrets.

name: Build and Publish SBOM
on:
  push:
    tags: [ 'v*' ]

jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
      id-token: write  # required for OIDC keyless signing

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Build artifact
        run: |
          export SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$(date +%s)
          # replace with your build
          mkdir -p dist && tar --mtime=@$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH -cf dist/myapp-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz -C build .
      - name: Install syft
        run: curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
      - name: Generate SBOM
        run: syft packages dir:dist -o cyclonedx-json > dist/sbom.cdx.json
      - name: Compute checksums
        run: sha256sum dist/* | tee dist/checksums.txt
      - name: Sign artifact (cosign keyless)
        run: cosign sign-blob --payload dist/myapp-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz dist/myapp-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz.sig
      - name: Upload release bundle
        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
        with:
          files: |
            dist/myapp-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz
            dist/myapp-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz.sig
            dist/sbom.cdx.json
            dist/sbom.cdx.json.asc

Verification: what consumers should do

1. Download artifact bundle or pull from registry.
2. Verify checksum: compare computed sha256 to .sha256 value.
3. Verify signature: gpg --verify or cosign verify-blob for OCI-signed blobs.
4. Parse SBOM (CycloneDX) and check for known vulnerable or unexpected components with a scanner (Grype or CycloneDX tooling).
5. For autonomous desktop AI outputs, apply the same verification to generated plugins or local artifacts before executing them (see AI agents guidance on runtime risk).

Binding provenance to autonomous outputs (desktop AI case)

Desktop AIs create outputs at runtime — documents, scripts, or even compiled code. To retain provenance for these outputs, follow the same pipeline, but capture the runtime context:

• Record the runtime SBOM: packages and runtime libs used during generation.
• Capture model or weights hash (if a model influenced the output) and include as material in the SBOM or a provenance attestation (see guidance for desktop LLM agents).
• Sign the output with a device-scoped key or user key (cosign or GPG) and include a link to the runtime SBOM and the artifact that produced it.

# example: sign an autonomous output and include model hash
sha256sum model.pkl | awk '{print $1}' > runtime/model.sha256
sha256sum output/generated-script.sh > output/generated-script.sh.sha256
cosign sign-blob --payload output/generated-script.sh output/generated-script.sh.sig
# include a small provenance JSON
cat > output/provenance.json <